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We must always be ready, so that ifan enemy approaches us with a sharp
sword, we do not meet him only armed with an ornamental rapier.
Carl von Clausewitz
General Carl von Clausewitz offers a lesson that many military forces have used
as a basis for establishing inventories for war. Today, large inventories represent
inefficiencies and opportunity forgone. The 1998 Department of Defense (DoD)
Logistics Strategic Plan directed a sweeping program to reform the "business" of the
DoD. In response, the Department of the Navy's Business Vision and Goals statement
asserts that, as the Cold War ended, the U.S. private sector revolutionized business
practices in response to increasing foreign competition and a rapidly expanding global
economy [Ref. 1].
Over the past decade, the American commercial sector has reorganized,
restructured, and adopted revolutionary new business practices in order
to ensure its competitive edge in the rapidly changing global marketplace.
It has worked. Now the Department must adopt and adapt the lessons of
the private sector if our Armed Forces are to maintain their competitive
edge in the rapidly changing global arena.
The Department has made much progress already .... However, we need
to go muchfurther and deeper, and we need congressional support.
Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen
The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review
One of the fundamental principles described within the DoD Logistics Strategic
Plan [Ref. 2] is that inventories be established at the lowest levels possible, and that they
be positioned to permit rapid delivery to the customer. Among the objectives of the DoD
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Logistics Strategic Plan are the reduction of worldwide inventories to achieve the DoD
and National Performance Review (NPR) goals and the implementation of a "virtual"
inventory control point structure within each component. A "virtual" inventory control
point, as defined within the plan, is a management structure for multiple, geographically
separate inventory control points under a single command. There is a common overhead
support structure (e.g., personnel, finance, automated data processing (ADP) systems)
that integrates the operation of multiple sites through electronic communication
interfaces. [Ref. 1]
In order to bring modern business practices into Marine Corps logistics, the
Marine Corps has established a "virtual float" concept, which seeks to reduce inventory
levels for secondary repairables (SecReps). SecReps are items designated as repairable,
where repair is more economical and timely than purchase. Additionally, SecReps
provide each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) commander with a pool of critical items
to facilitate high levels of equipment readiness. This ensures that the principal end items
(PEI) can be brought out of combat deadline status by a pool of critical SecReps. [Ref. 3]
Currently, each MEF has a combat service support (CSS) organization to support
its ground operations. Operating in four geographical regions, each CSS organization
independently owns and manages an inventory of SecReps. The Supply Management
Business Area (SMBA) of the Navy Working Capital Fund (NWCF) dictates the
methodology for buying and selling repairable assets. Each CSS organization computes
its individual requirements and then establishes requisitioning objectives (RO) and
allowances accordingly. The total allowance incorporates the computed RO plus local
considerations to accommodate contingency requirements and potential data inaccuracy
(safety stock). The result has been excessive stocks throughout the Marine Corps.
Because each CSS organization determines the number of repairables to maintain through
an item approach, which is to buy enough repairables to cover the lead-time demand plus
some safety level to protect against demand variability, more SecReps are maintained
within the Marine Corps Supply system than required. [Ref. 3]
The inventory policy for SecReps within the Marine Corps can be further
characterized as a decentralized stock of repairables maintained through active and
reserve establishments. The Support activity supply system (SASSY) Management Units
(SMU) operate within each CSS organization to manage and control SecReps in a region,
including all elements of the supported MEF. Funding is allocated to each MEF through
the local SMU, based upon the factors that make up a stock computation formula and the
historical local experience with washout rates. In response to maintenance requests from
using units or customers of the SMU, SecReps are obtained from either a source of
supply (SOS) in the case of a washout, off the shelf of the maintenance float activity as a
direct exchange, or a delayed issue in the case of maintenance backlog or backorder (BO)
situation. In the case of a request submitted from a geographically dislocated unit, the
item is passed to a DoD transportation management office (TMO) for shipment using
either Defense Transportation System or commercial assets. The SecRep is then received
at the supporting TMO and distributed to the requesting unit. The present dollar value of
SecReps stocks in the Marine Corps is listed in Table 1.1.
Location Inventory Value
Marine Corps Logistics Bases $391,000,000
East Coast active forces $162,645,000
West Coast active forces $135,230,000
Okinawa active forces $82,118,000
Blount Island Command $40,661,000
Reserve Forces $32,262,000
Hawaii active forces $16,950,000
Total $860,866,000
Table 1.1 Current Inventory Values of SecReps by Location [Ref. 31
B. PURPOSE
The purpose of this research is to examine inventory management of repairables
within the U.S. Marine Corps and to evaluate the potential benefits involved with
establishing a virtual warehouse to manage SecReps. The VW will set the framework for
centralized management of all SecReps and provide the foundation for applications used
for future inventory management. Using a simulation model, we consider trade-offs
associated with centralized inventory management, stock reduction, and transportation
costs. Specifically, we address the following questions: Given consolidated management
of secondary repairable items through a "virtual warehouse concept", what overall
inventory policy satisfies demand while minimizing inventory holding cost and
transportation cost? Moreover, what are the potential issues and problems involved with
centralized management?
C. METHODOLOGY
We present two simulation models for management of SecReps within a virtual
warehouse. First, we model an inventory management policy that does not allow lateral
re-supply between bases. The model describes the demand placed on the supply system
at the using unit level (MEF supported units) and the subsequent demand placed on the
Marine Corps Depots. Figure 1 illustrates the flow of material without lateral re-supply.
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Figure 1. Flow of Material Without Lateral Re-supply
The second model describes an inventory management policy that does allow
lateral re-supply between bases. The model also describes the demand placed on the
supply system at the using unit level (MEF supported units) and the subsequent flow of
demand placed on the Marine Corps Depots.
Demand for the SecReps we selected was based on the mean time between failure
(MTBF) of the items. As the SecRep fails, it generates a demand for a replacement
SecRep. We obtained estimated demand and MTBF data from interviews with
intermediate level and depot-level maintenance personnel. We obtained transportation
cost data from a representative LTL carrier. Costs are based on the rate provided to the
government for transportation to and from each node in the supply network. Our
conceptual model of the Marine Corps repair process is based on interviews with
intermediate level and depot-level maintenance personnel.
Our results suggest that the Marine Corps should not expect large savings from a
virtual float operating with a lateral transfer inventory policy. For the items we consider,
we show that additional transportation costs significantly offset holding cost savings for a
lateral transfer policy. Additionally, our research also reveals that there are significant
issues that should be determined before moving to a centralized inventory system: How
will a virtual float be structured? Will all the participants within the supply chain have
equal input? Does the central item mangers have adequate information to make informed
decisions about how much to stock and where to stock required SecReps? Is there
enough capacity and resources at each node in the supply chain to support lateral transfers
of SecReps? If there are two or more locations with the same requirement at the same
time, who within a virtual float will decide which location will receive the support?
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II describes the current
supply chain for SecRep items, how inventory levels are currently set throughout the
Marine Corps, and related research in repairable inventory management. Chapter III
addresses our research questions through a SecRep inventory simulation model and
presents issues concerning centralized management of inventories. We describe the data
used to support our research and the results of the simulations. Chapter IV presents
conclusions and recommendations.
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II. THE CURRENT SUPPLY CHAIN FOR SECONDARY REPAIRABLES
We present an overview of the basic functions of the repairable issue point (RIP)
and the current supply chain for secondary repairable items. Additionally, we describe
the demand based sparing (DBS) methodology currently used to determine inventory
levels for SecReps and discuss relevant studies in repairable inventory management.
A. REPAIRABLE ISSUE POINTS
Repairable issue points provide a pool of repairable assets available for direct
exchange by using units. The RIP also serves as the intermediary between using units
and supporting repair facilities. RIPs are located within the Fleet Marine Force (FMF)
and are managed by the Force Service Support Group (FSSG) for common-ground assets
and individual units for Critical Low Density (CDL) assets. The primary functions of a
RIP include:
• Computing RIP allowances to determine how many SecReps to hold.
• Producing a catalog of items held to provide to their customers and requisition
SecReps as needed.
• Receiving and distributing SecRep assets.
• Returning RIP items to the Depot Maintenance Activities (DMAs) or to
commercial vendors.
• When directed, budgeting and managing funds required for RIP asset
replenishment, including customer charges for assets issued store account code
one (SAC 1 ) without an unserviceable turn-in.
Additionally, each RIP conducts and arranges the RIP inventory by identifying assets
for redistribution and ensuring that on hands are within authorized allowances. RIPs also
control and monitor repair cycle times (RCT) for assets being repaired and establish
repair priorities of assets to maximize support for their respective customers [Ref. 5].
Current Marine Corps policy [Ref. 5] states that repair will be accomplished at the
lowest possible echelon of maintenance. When unserviceable items require repair,
secondary repairable items are made available on a direct exchange basis. When an
unserviceable SecRep cannot be repaired locally, using units exchange the item at the
appropriate RIP. If the RIP does not have a serviceable SecRep on the shelf, a back order
is established upon turn-in of the unserviceable SecRep. Appendix A, which is based on
a 1996 study of repair cycle times (RCT) and order ship times (OST) conducted by the
Field Supply and Maintenance Analysis Office-3 (FSMAO-3) [Ref. 6], describes the
supply and maintenance effort in detail and the functions that the RIP has within the
overall maintenance process. Figure 2 illustrates the process.
To ensure uniform management of repairable items throughout the Marine Corps,
management is based upon the Source Maintenance and Recoverability Code (SMRC)
assigned to each item entering the Marine Corps inventory during the initial issue
provisioning process. A SMRC is a five-digit code that identifies the echelons of
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maintenance required to condemn, repair, or remove an item from service. The code is
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Figure 2. RIP Process
The source code, which makes up the first and second digits, is assigned to an
item to indicate the manner of acquiring the support item for maintenance repair, or
overhaul of an end item. Although the code is primarily used at the wholesale level, the
RIP is generally concerned with the code because it identifies how the repairable is
assembled, procured or stocked. For example, in the SMRC PAFHH, PA indicates that
the item is to be procured and stocked for anticipated, known usage. This indicates that
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the equivalent to a RO/ROP would be established for this item at the wholesale level.
[Ref. 7]
The maintenance code identifies the echelon of maintenance authorized to
remove, replace, and completely repair a secondary repairable. The first digit of the
maintenance code, which is the third position of the SMRC, indicates the lowest echelon
of maintenance authorized to remove or replace a secondary repairable item. The second
digit of the maintenance code or fourth position of the SMRC is the repair code, which
indicates the lowest echelon of maintenance authorized to affect complete repair. In our
example of PAFHH, FH indicates that a 3rd echelon maintenance shop can remove an
item and a 4 th echelon maintenance shop can repair an item. [Ref. 7]
The recoverability code identifies whether or not an item is repairable, and more
importantly, the disposition action to be taken for an unserviceable asset. In our example
of PAFHH, H indicates that the item should be condemned and disposed of at 4 th echelon
maintenance.
1. Categories of Customers and SecReps
Repairable issue point customers fall into two categories: using units, such as
battalions, aircraft groups, and companies; and maintenance shops of the Intermediate
Maintenance Activities (IMAs) [Ref. 5]. Table 2.1 indicates the number of customers







IMEF IstFSSG 118 2500
II MEF 2nd FSSG 125 3100
III MEF 3rd FSSG 76 2300
CSSG3 13 1800
Table 2.1 Number of Customers
There are six possible situations in which RIP customers may warrant an
exchange between the RIP and supported customers and cause a decrease in RIP
inventory [Ref. 9].
• A customer turns in a SecRep and is issued a like item.
• A customer turns in a SecRep and is issued a SecRep that is different from the
item being turned in.
• A customer turns in a SecRep in which the RIP does not have the item on-
hand (OH) and must BO the required SecRep.
• A customer has a requirement for a SecRep, but does not have a carcass to
turn in for repair. The RIP issues the item without a carcass turn-in.
• A customer has a requirement for a SecRep, but does not have a carcass to
turn-in for repair and the RIP does not have the item to issue. The RIP BOs
the item without a carcass turned-in.
• A BO that was previously cancelled is reinstated to fill a customers
requirement.
Secondary repairable items are separated into two distinct categories: Depot Level
Repairable (DLR) and Field Level Repairable (FLR). DLR items are items that can be
repaired, which repair is the primary source of supply for the item. Before a new DLR
item is ordered, every attempt is made to repair the item. Customers waiting for DLR
items are normally waiting on the repair cycle time (RCT) for the asset vice the order ship
time (OST) of a new DLR item. The Marine Corps determines if a SecRep can be
considered a DLR item by the following criteria: if rebuilding or repairing the SecRep
lower than a fifth echelon maintenance activity (depot level) adversely diminishes the
mobility or dilutes the maintenance support capability of the FMF, because of special
skills, tools, or test equipment not maintained within the FMF, the item is considered a
DLR and is repaired only at the depots. When DLR items are required by FMF
customers, each RIP provides the required DLR item and ships the carcass DLR to the
depot for repair. When the RIP computes inventory levels for DLR items, consideration
is given to order ship time from the depot to the RIP. In contrast, FLR items are repaired
at the lowest level of maintenance by IMAs and normally do not require special test
equipment, tools, or skills not maintained within the FMF. [Ref. 9]
2. Demand Based Sparing (DBS)
Demand based sparing has been a staple method used for inventory management
within the Marine Corps. Stock levels are determined independently of decisions to stock
other items and are often based on usage data, which indicates how often an item has
been requested over a given time horizon. The depth of an item is determined by
requisitioning objective (RO) and repair cycle requirement (RCR).
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Currently each RIP computes its individual requirement and then establishes an
RO. The total allowance incorporates the computed RO plus local considerations to
accommodate contingency requirements and safety stock. The RO is calculated based on
the following formulas [Ref. 3]:
RO = RCR + OSR + SL
where,
RR = Repair Rate
RCT = Repair Cycle Time
RCR = Repair Cycle Requirement
OSR = Order Ship Requirement
SL = Safety Level
RO = Requisitioning Objective
The requisitioning objective (RO) specifies the stock level at which a
replenishment order is placed. This is similar to the use of reorder points (ROP) for
consumable items. The repair cycle requirement (RCR) considers how long it takes to
repair a given SecRep by measuring the repair rate (RR) and the repair cycle time (RCT)
over a thirty (30) day period. The RR is the number of items successfully repaired per
month. The RCT is the time between a SecRep being known to be faulty and the time it is
repaired and available for issue again. The RO is set to minimize the risk of stock-out
between the time a SecRep is issued and the carcass is repaired and ready for subsequent
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issues. Each RIP must trade-off between the cost of incurring one or more stock-outs and
the cost of holding additional stock to cover the possibility of unanticipated demand.
Safety levels (SL) are set to protect against demand variability during the lead-time. In
the case of SecReps. the repair rate of the local IMA and the order ship requirement,
which is the number of items requested from the RIP minus the RR, are factors
considered during the lead-time. Because of the decentralized nature of management for
SecReps, each RIP computes its RO independent of the depot and other RIPs. As a
result, SL stocks are maintained above what the overall system requires. The overall
system is the total requirement for the Marine Corps vice the requirement of each MEF
[Ref. 3]
Unlike the commercial sector, Marine Corps inventory requirements are driven by
national security commitments and training requirements. Since foreign crises frequently
flare up with no warning and many critical SecReps have lead times that are significant,
the Marine Corps maintains stock for items it may never use as insurance against the
threat of a foreign crisis.
B. RELATED RESEARCH
We focus on reducing SecRep inventory levels throughout the Marine Corps by
simulating the supply chain and reducing the depth of SecReps maintained at each
location (I s ' FSSG, 2 nd FSSG. 3 rd FSSG, CSSG-3, MCLB Barstow, and MCLB Albany)
to reduce inventory cost and provide the same level of service.
Other studies, such as readiness based sparing (RBS) methodology, currently used
by the Navy, Army, and Air Force, are based on the multi-echelon techniques for
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recoverable item control (METRIC) developed by Sherbrooke [Ref. 10]. Sherbrooke
examined repairable inventory management through a system approach, which asks such
questions as: How can we insure that 95% of our weapons systems will be not be delayed
for lack of spare parts? and, How much more money do we need to move from 95% to
something higher? More generally, Sherbrooke discusses what can we do to change our
logistics support structure to achieve a desired availability more efficiently? Is it
economical to have more repair capability at the operating sites? Sherbrooke contends
that a system approach is superior to an item approach because it provides management
with predictions of availability levels with reduced inventory investment.
Readiness based sparing is a system approach based on the premises set forth by
Sherbrooke whose goal is to maximize the operational availability of a weapon system
within management imposed budgetary constraints. Operational availability (A ) is the
percentage of time that a system is capable of performing its intended function. Figure 3
illustrates the components of operational availability. Key to operational availability is
the elements contained in "downtime". Figure 4 From [Ref. 11] illustrates the
components of downtime.
TIGER is the U.S. Navy approved reliability, maintainability and availability
(RMA) simulation model, which is a time-continuous reconstruction of a weapons
systems' "average" mission involving simultaneous consideration of the system and other
events [Ref. 12]. NAVSEA uses a simulation model instead of deterministic equations
because: as a system's complexity increases, so do the number of variables necessary to
define the system and the number of associated equations to be solved through
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deterministic methods. NAVSEA contends that when one adds in repair, re-supply,
partial degradation, variable duty factors, variable operating factors, allowed downtime
events, and all the other variable complexities of real-life system operations, the more
difficult it becomes to write probability of success formulae's required by deterministic
methods. NAVSEA asserts that a simulation can handle these complexities. [Ref. 11]
Within the private sector, similar arguments have been made with respect to use
of simulation modeling. Archibald, et al. [Ref. 13: p.4] utilize the IBM Supply Chain
Analyzer, a supply chain simulation model, to demonstrate the financial impact of several
supply chain policy alternatives. The authors indicate that as companies rely on a mix of
suppliers, transportation resources, assemblers, warehousing firms, and retail outlets to
bring their product to the market, it becomes difficult to determine the impact of changes
in performance with any of the elements in the supply chain. Archibald, et al. conclude
that using a simulation model as a tool to give visibility of the entire supply chain can
allow for the testing of numerous "what if scenarios such as outsourcing, consolidating
vendors, collaborative planning, or implementing e-business. The net result asserted by
the authors is that companies can achieve significant improvement in operational and
financial performance of the entire supply chain by simulating their process and testing
proposed policy changes before implementation.
The Marine Corps has started to progress towards RBS by sponsoring studies by
the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), including a review of RBS requirements and the
situation of the present state of logistics systems and data collection [Ref. 14]. CNA's
[Ref. 14. 15] conclusions suggest a difficult road in implementing RBS within the Marine
18
Corps due to inaccurate data collection. Penrose [Ref. 16] confirms the findings from
CNA.
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Figure 4. Operational Availability-Elements of Downtime From [Ref. 11].
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III. SECONDARY REPAIRABLE SUPPLY CHAIN SIMULATION
Senge [Ref. 35] suggests that in order to determine organizational disabilities, it
helps to start with a laboratory experiment... a microcosm of how real organizations
function, where you can see the consequences of your decisions play out more clearly
than is possible in real organizations. Hicks [Ref. 17] asserts that traditional modeling
paradigms do not possess sufficient flexibility and scalability to render effective business
solutions, and that simulation and optimization modeling techniques are an effective
means to make operational, tactical, or strategic decisions. Ingalls and Kasales [Ref. 18]
describe today's business environment as dynamic and driven by many decisions in the
supply chain. They state that companies will buffer inventory or carry excess capacity in
order to handle the dynamics of the business world.
The purpose of this chapter is to present our SecRep simulation inventory model
and to examine inventory management of repairable items within the Marine Corps. We
first present an overview of the model and describe the inventory logic, repair process and
how we modeled demand. In addition, we provide the results of the simulations and
discuss the issues involved with centralized and decentralized inventory systems.
A. MODELS
We present two simulation models for inventory management of SecReps within a
virtual warehouse. First, we develop a simulation model of an inventory management
policy that does not allow lateral re-supply between bases. The model describes the
demand placed on the supply system at the unit level (MEF supported units) and the
20
subsequent demand placed on the Marine Corps Depots. The SecRep simulation model
determines the level of supply required to maintain 90% availability of the PEI at each
base. Additionally, the model determines the number of times each base had to be re-
supplied from each depot or through inventories held within each base, and the number of
times each base could be re-supplied through repair from its IMA. Figure 1.1 illustrates
the flow of demand with an inventory policy that is re-supplied through the depots with
no lateral re-supply from the bases.
The second simulation model describes an inventory management policy that
allows lateral re-supply between bases. Again, the goal is to determine the level of
supply required to maintain a 90% availability of the PEI at each base, while allowing
lateral re-supply between bases. Lateral re-supply is made whenever a demand at a base
causes a backorder (i.e., stock on hand is zero and a customer has a unfilled demand) and
a SecRep at some other base can be transported to the base before an item already in
transit from a depot or one completing base repair. The model determines the number of
times each base had to be re-supplied from each depot or through inventories held within
each base, and the number of times each base was able to be re-supplied through repair
from its IMA. For example, if a demand for an item is received at 1 st FSSG and both
depots are out of stock, the model considers the level of inventory at all other bases and
selects the required item based on transportation costs and the presence of stock at the
base. In our example, 1 st FSSG would first search 2 nd FSSG because it has the lowest
transportation cost, then CSSG-3 because it has the next lowest transportation cost, and
complete the search with 3 rd FSSG, which has the highest transportation cost. Once the
21
required item has been located at any of the other bases, the item is sent to 1
st FSSG and
the search stops. Figure 5 illustrates the flow of material with lateral re-supply. A
weakness of the algorithm is that it does not consider forthcoming availability of items in
repair. As we will show, this is a significant weakness because transportation costs for












Figure 5. Flow of Material With Lateral Re-supply
We developed our model in a simulation language, Arena with graphics
animation. In Arena, simulation models are built by placing modules in a working area
of the model window, providing data for these modules, and specifying the flow of
entities through the modules. The module defines the underlying logic that is applied
??
when an entity is directed to the module, as well as the associated graphical animation, to
depict the module's activities during a simulation run [Ref. 29].
1. Inventor} Logic
We consider a base stock inventory control policy in which a replenishment order
is submitted at the time of demand. We assume that the demand each day is Poisson
distributed and independent from day-to-day. Figure 6 provides an overview of the
inventory losic at a base.
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Figure 6. Overview the Inventory Logic at a Base
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We assume the lead-time between the placement of an order and its arrival to the
required base follows routine shipping delays. Table 3.1 describes the lead-time between
bases for routine shipments (in the lower triangle) and the distance between two locations
(in the upper triangle). Appendix B provides the service standards from each base within
the 48 contiguous states. Table 3.2 describes the shipping cost per pound as provided by


















LEJUNE. NC 572 2558 2666 2693 2971 2978
ALBANY. GA 2 2210 2206 2253 2619 2627 2171
BARSTOW.
CA 5+ 5+ 164 132 409 417 180
CAMP
PENDLETON
.CA 5+ 5+ 2
Days/
71 /' 455 463 40
LONG
BEACH, CA 5^ 5+ 1 V 1 Miles/ 395 403 111
OAKLAND,
CA 5+ 5+ 3 3 2 8 495
SAN
FRANCISCO,




• CA 5+ 5+ 2 -ii 3 3 3
(Note: For shipments to Hawaii add 10 day to the lead-time from Long Beach. For shipments to Okinawa,
add 21 days to the lead-time from Long Beach)
Table 3.1 Lead Time Between Bases [Ref. 27]
We create an initial inventory queue to replicate current inventory levels at each
base and check the inventory queue throughout the simulation. After each demand for a
SecRep. a signal is sent to the depot to send a replacement SecRep if the inventory queue
falls below authorized allowances. As the PEIs begin to fail during the simulation, the
simulated FMF unit conducts an initial maintenance inspection and prepares to send the
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PEI to the IMA. We assume that all failed PEls are sent to the IMA and the delay time
from the unit to the IMA is the same for all bases. Once the PEI arrives at the IMA. the
failed SecRep. which is an engine in our case, is removed and enters the maintenance
cycle. The PEI enters a wait queue until an available SecRep is matched to the required
PEI. At the same time the PEI enters the wait queue, a system inventory check is
conducted within the simulation. First, the SecRep inventory level at the base is checked.
If there are no SecReps on hand, the PEI continues to wait until a SecRep is made
available through repair or the RIP's stock has been replenished from another source of
supply. In the case of lateral re-supply, a search is conducted at the other bases for the
required SecRep. If the SecRep is available at another base, it is transported to the




























NO 572 2558 2666 2693 2971 2978 2631
ALBANY, GA S0.46 2210 2206 2253 2619 2627 2171
8ARSTOW,
CA SO. 96 S0.90 164 132 409 417 180
GAMP
PENDLETON,
CA $0.88 $0.71 $0.31
Cost 71
/ 455 463 !40
LONG
BEACH, CA $0.75 S0.77 S0.2^ $0.15 Miles:;.-
.
'-.. 395 403 111
OAKLAND,













CA $0.64 $0.85 $0.39 $0.25 $0.43 $0.60 S0.45
Table 3.2 Shipping Cost Per Pound as Provided by Overnight Transportation
Once the PEI is matched to the required SecRep, the PEI is sent back into the
system and counted. We track the operational availability at each location by
determining the number of failed PEIs at the base divided by the total number of PEIs.
Table 3.3 provides the PEIs selected for our evaluation as well as the location and number
of PEIs available at each location [Ref. 30].
TAMCN PEI IMEF IIMEF III MEF
E0796,E0846,E0856 Assault Amphibious Vehicle 247 237 66
D1059 Truck, Cargo, 5-ton 1019 962 682
D0209 Power Unit, LVS 356 334 214
D1158 Truck, Cargo, HMMWV 1727 1751 1159
(Note: I MEF is located in Camp Pendleton, CA; II MEF is located in Camp Lejeune, NC; and III MEF is
located in Okinawa, Japan and Hawaii)
Table 3.3. Principal End Items (PEIs) and Their Locations [Ref. 30)
We use the operational availability at each location to compare the effects of the
two different inventory policies. Given the PEIs listed in Table 3.3 and the levels of
inventory within the supply chain, we determine the operational availability for the base
scenario by simulating demand at each location. Table 3.4 gives the actual inventory
levels and RO levels for each base. We use these as the basis for our simulation [Ref. 19,
20,21,22].
For the second scenario, we determine the initial operational availability at each
base and then we reduce the inventory systematically at each base until the operational
availability matches the A from the first scenario. We use the same string of random
numbers generated from our first scenario and apply those numbers to our second
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2nd FSSG AAV Engine 2815011408799 3484 150 $51,994.54 $35,347.61 72
I
72 14 37
3rd FSSG AAV Engine 2815011408799 3484 150 $51,994.54 $35,347.61 20 16 12 3
CSSG 3 AAV Engine 2851501140879 3484 150 $51,994.54 $35,347.61 5 4 1
Albany AAV Engine 2851501140879 3484 150 $51,994.54 $35,347.61 - -
1
47 -
Barstow AAV Engine 2815011408799 3484 150 $51,994.54 $35,347.61 - -
|
84 -
IstFSSG 15-Ton Engine 2815001780268 \ 4255 118.7 $22,322.00 $12,723.54 13
!
13 5 8
2nd FSSG 5-Ton Engine 2815001780268 4255 118.7 $22,322.00 $12,723.54 21 21 7 8
3rd FSSG :5-Ton Engine 2815001780268 4255 118.7 $22,322.00 $12,723.54 15
!
21 9
CSSG 3 5-Ton Engine 2815001780268
.
4255 118.7 $22,322.00 $12,723.54 6 6 1 2
Albany 5-Ton Engine 2815001780268 4255 118.7 $22,322.00 $12,723.54 - -
;
23 -
Barstow 15-Ton Engine 2815001780268 4255 118.7 $22,322.00 $12,723.54 - : - 13 -
IstFSSG LVS Engine 2815011867251 2875 150 $27,609.00 $27,609.00 10 \ 10 1 10
2nd FSSG LVS Engine 2815011867251 2875 150 $27,609.00 $27,609.00 13 13 4 10
3rd FSSG LVS Engine 2815011867251 2875 150 $27,609 00 $27,609.00 7 9 7
CSSG 3 LVS Engine 2815011867251 2875 150 $27,609.00 $27,609.00 7 4 3 1
Albany LVS Engine 2815011867251 2875 150 $27,609.00 $27,609.00 - -
j
37 -




IstFSSG Engine 2815014396664 650 15.87 $6,666.00 $6,660.00 45 45 9 11
HMMWV
2nd FSSG Engine 2815014396664 650 15.87 $6,666.00 $6,666.00 63 52 23 14
HMMWV
3rd FSSG Engine 2815014396664 650 15.87 $6,666.00 $6,666.00 38 i 46 15 18
HMMWV
CSSG 3 Engine 2815014396664 650 15.87 $6,666.00 $6,666.00 15
!
15 2 ; 2
HMMWV
Albany Engine 2815014396664 650 15.87 $6,666.00 $6,666.00
HMMWV
Barstow Engine 2815014396664 650 15.87 $6,666.00 $6,666.00 - - .
Table 3.4 Supply Chain Information [Ref. 19, 20, 21, 22]
2. Repair Process Logic
The repair process runs every period, in our case daily, to determine if the
principal end item (PEI) has failed. As the PEIs begin to fail, a parallel process occurs
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within the simulation. The failed SecRep is removed from the PEI and placed into the
repair process, while the PEI enters a wait queue and searches for a replacement SecRep
according to the inventory logic. We assume that only one SecRep has failed per PEI.
As the SecRep enters the repair process, the simulated IMA determines if the SecRep can
be repaired at its level or if the item is beyond repair. We assign probabilities that a
SecRep can be repaired by the IMA, must be sent to the depot for repair, or must be
disposed of based on the washout percentage for the SecRep at the base. The washout
percentage is the number of SecReps not repaired at the IMA divided by the total
SecReps that arrived for repair. Table 3.5 describes the maintenance characteristics of
each SecRep [Ref. 19, 20. 21, 22].
Repaired By Sent to Sent To TAT (Min-Max) in
Location Item MTBF IMA DRMO Depot days
IstFSSG AAV Engine 50 95% 1% 4% 3-120
2nd FSSG AAV Engine 50 77% 2% 21% 3-120
3rd FSSG AAV Engine 50 96%
i
1% 3% 2-180
CSSG3 AAV Engine 50 97% 1% 2% 2-180
IstFSSG 5-Ton Engine 720 97% 1% 2% 3-120
2nd FSSG 5-Ton Engine 720 62% 4% 34% 3-120
3rd FSSG 5-Ton Engine 720 97% 1% 2% 2-180
CSSG3 5-Ton Engine 720 97% 2% 1% 2-180
IstFSSG LVS Engine 400 95% 1% 5% 3-120
2nd FSSG LVS Engine 400 93% 1% 6% 3-120
3rd FSSG LVS Engine 400 95% 1% 5% 2-180












3 rd FSSG Engine
HMMWV
500 95% 1% 4% 2-180
CSSG3 Engine 500 91% 1% 8% 2-180
Table 3.5 Maintenance Characteristics of Each SecRep [Ref. 19, 20, 21, 22]
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We count the number of SecReps disposed from each base. We assume that the
SecRep is sent to a local Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DRMS) and
transportation cost is minimal. If the SecRep has been determined to be beyond the IMA
capability of repair and sent to the depot, we track the number of times the SecRep is sent
to the depot in order to calculate transportation costs. We assume the depots have an
infinite source of SecReps and that the TAT follows a uniform distribution with a
minimum of 30 days and a maximum of 45 days [Ref. 31]. If the IMA repairs the
SecRep, parts are ordered for the repair and it is delayed until the parts arrive. The delay
time is based on the supply support capability of the local SMU. We assign a probability
that the supporting SMU will have the required parts based on the equipment repair order
(ERO) fill rate of the local SMU [Ref. 28]; that is, the percentage of critical EROs for
which all high-priority requisitions were immediately available from the local supply.
We estimated the average ERO fill rate for I MEF at 37.5%, II MEF at 16%, and III MEF
at 25.7% based on the data from the Marine Corps's Precision Logistics Web site [Ref.
28].
In practice, a SecRep is repaired at the IMA as soon as all of the required parts
have been received. We use the RCT for the item to determine how long the SecRep is
delayed due to repair. We were unable to obtain data on the RCT for each of the SecReps
we selected; instead, we used the overall average RCT of each IMA. We assume a
Poisson distribution and with mean cycle times for I MEF of 30.3 days, II MEF 42 days,
and III MEF 44.8 days [Ref. 28].
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Upon completion of repair, the SecRep moves to a decision module to determine
whether or not the SecRep is still required. If the SecRep is still required it is matched to
a PEL tallied, and sent back to the system. If the SecRep is no longer required, because
the PEI was matched with a SecRep from local stocks or through re-supply from the
depot in the case of our first scenario or through lateral re-supply from another base in the
case of our second scenario, the SecRep is sent the local RIP inventory. In reality, the
repaired SecRep would be redistributed if local on hand amounts exceed authorized
allowances. Figure 7 provides an overview of the repair process logic used in the
simulation.
B. MODELING DEMAND
We model demand by using the failure rate of the PEI, or in our case the mean
time between failure (MTBF) of an engine. The MTBF is the length of time that an item
is available to perform its intended function [Ref. 10]. We estimated the MTBF of the
items through interviews with I-level and depot level maintenance personnel. Table 3.5
describes the MTBF for our selected SecReps. As the PEIs begin to fail within the
simulation, a demand is created for a SecRep. We estimate the length of time that each
PEI is operational at two hours per day with a total of 730 hours of usage per year. It is
important to note that our assumptions of the MTBFs and our estimated usage of PEIs
within the simulation directly affect the expected savings achieved within the simulation.
The higher the usage of the PEIs during the simulation the greater the number of failures
during our simulated two-year period. Our estimate of how often a PEI is used is based
30
on the author's experience, because the Marine Corps does not record actual usage or
MTBF data from exercises or daily operations.
SecRep Repair Logic at a Base
PEI Fails
Failed PEI waits for
initial Replacement















































Figure 7. Overview of the Repair Process Logic at a Base
C. WEAKNESS OF THE MODEL
Because multi-echelon systems are difficult to model and solve analytically, we
decouple the maintenance process, supply process, and inventory search logic as separate
operations and link the modules. This simplified method does not account for the
dependency of data used to make decisions throughout the supply chain. For example, if
all the participants within the supply chain have full access to all information with respect
to SecReps, consideration may be given to a location that has a requirement based on
operational commitments vice training or routine replenishments. Our model in essence
uses a greedy algorithm that transfers the SecRep on a first come first served basis.
D. RESULTS
We performed two runs of 50 replications of each inventory policy to simulate 24
months of demand. Scenario 1 is an inventory policy where we re-supply with no lateral
transfer, and scenario 2 is an inventory policy where we re-supply with lateral transfer
between bases.
First, we stocked each base with the inventory level corresponding to its RO and
simulated demand with no lateral transfer. Note that the simulated A does not reflect the
actual A within the FMF because we do not consider the effects of cannibalizations,
expedited shipments of required parts, actual mean time between failures for the SecReps,
and operational conditions and requirements that may exist within the FMF.
Next, we repeated the experiment with lateral transfer for each PEI, and recorded
the average A at each base. Then we repeatedly changed the RO at each base and ran the
experiment until we finally matched the average A from the no lateral transfer case.
Table 3.6 shows the results. Notice that we were able to reduce the SecRep stock at most
locations, but for bases that frequently re-supplied other bases, the stock level had to be
increased to maintain the same level of A„.
Under the current decentralized system, holding cost is not a factor or
consideration in determining RO levels. The U.S. Navy considers holding cost as 21% of
the cost of goods for repairable items and 23% for consumable items [Ref. 11]. Using
21% holding cost rate, we estimate the holding cost for the SecReps we selected to be
$2,047,946 per year (See Table 3.6). Our results indicate that a lateral re-supply policy
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30 76% 34 76% $1,767,814! $1,559,836: $371,241! $327,566
2nd FSSG Engine
AAV
72 82% 62 82% $3,223,661! $3,743,607! $676,969| $786,157
3rd FSSG Engine
AAV
16 96% 14 96% $727,924; $831,913! $152,864; $174,702
CSSG3 Engine
5-Ton
4 81% 6 81% $31 1 ,967! $207,978; $65,513| $43,675
IstFSSG Engine
5-Ton
13 90% 11 90% $245,542; $290,186 $51,564; $60,939
2nd FSSG Engine
5-Ton
21 94% 18 94% $401 ,796 $468,762i $84,377! $98,440
3rd FSSG Engine
5-Ton
21 91% 17 91% $379,474; $468,762: $79,690; $98,440
CSSG3 Engine
LVS
6 84% 7 84% $156,254 $133,932i $32,81 3i $28,126
IstFSSG Engine
LVS
10 86% 9 86% $248,481: $276,09O| $52,181] $57,979
2nd FSSG Engine
LVS




9 87% 7 87% $193,263; $248,481; $40,58&| $52,181
CSSG3 Engine
HMMWV
4 80% 3 80% $82,827 $110,436 $17,394 $23,192
1st FSSG Engine
HMMWV
45 87% 43 87% $286,638: $299,970; $60,194; $62,994
2nd FSSG Engine
HMMWV
52 88% 44 88% $293,304 $346,632i $61 ,594j $72,793
3rd FSSG Engine
HMMWV
46 89% 41 89% $273,306; $306,636; $57,394! $64,394
CSSG3 Engine 15 84% 14 84% $93,324 $99,990! $19,598| $20,998
Total 377 338 $8,906,448 $9,752,128 $1,870,354 $2,047,947
Table 3.6 Results of the Simulation
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Total 84 $10,659 $224,771
Table 3.7 Number of Transfers and Cost
Routine
Routine Shipments
Shipments under under Scenario
Engine Scenario 1 Avg Cost Total Cost 2 Avg Cost Total Cost
AAV 23 $2,895 $66,585 16 $2,745 $43,920
5-Ton 21 $4,125 $86,625 12 $3,120 $37,440
LVS 18 $1,985 $35,730 10 $1,985 $19,850
HMMWV 22 $401 $8,822 14 $401 $5,614
Total $197,762 $106,824
Table 3.8 Routine Transportation Cost
Total transportation costs for the lateral transfer policy were significantly higher.
We estimated average costs for lateral transfers and routine shipments (see Tables 3.7 and
3.8), based on the cost per pound listed in Table 3.2. The average routine shipping costs
are less because more shipments in scenario 2 are made to l sl FSSG and 2 nd FSSG from
the depots, and transportation cost to these FSSGs is lower than the cost to ship to CSSG-
3 and 3 rd FSSG. The average transfer costs are higher because distant locations were the
primary beneficiary of lateral transfers.
We estimate total shipping cost for the no lateral transfer case to be $197,762.
Total transportation cost for the case with lateral transfers was $331,595, including
$224,771 just for lateral transfers. The combined inventory holding and transportation
cost savings for the lateral transfer case were only $43,760 annually.
Our results also suggest that items with a higher failure rate would potentially
achieve less savings, which supports Sherbrooke's claim [Ref. 10: p. 226] that lateral re-
supply has a greater impact when demand rates are low. In Table 3.6, AAV engines did
not realize the same level of stock reduction that the 5-ton, HMMWV, and LVS engines
did. We were able to reduce AAV engine inventory by only 4.9%, compared to 13.1%,
10.1% and 25% for 5-Ton, HMMWV and LVS engines, respectively.
Additionally, Sherbrooke suggests that the benefits of lateral re-supply are
overstated and argues that lateral re-supply will have a beneficial impact only when the
transfer time is one-fourth or less of the base repair time. He contends that the base can
change its repair priorities and repair an item, if it has repair parts, in less than the average
repair time. He concludes that lateral re-supply will provide little benefit when items are
base-repairable. Over 90% of the items we selected are repaired at the base, which may
contribute to the marginal financial benefits of a centralized system within our model.
We also do not consider that each IMA and the SMU can shift resources in order to
provide the required SecRep to the supported unit.
We believe that our model does not show a significant cost savings between the
two inventory policies for at least two reasons:
1 . The geographical layout of the supply chain for SecReps is not propitious to a
lateral transfer policy, because the nodes within the supply network cover half the
globe. From I s ' FSSG in Camp Pendleton, California to 2nd FSSG in Camp
Lejeune. North Carolina is more than 3000 miles; from Camp Pendleton to
Okinawa. Japan is more than 12,500 miles; and from Camp Pendleton to Hawaii
is more than 5,700 miles. Considering that most SecReps weigh a considerable
amount, the shipping costs associated with a lateral transfer policy diminish the
benefits gained from reduced inventory levels and lower holding costs. It might
be the case that SecReps weighing less than appropriate limits can be shipped via
air relatively inexpensively, making the lateral transfer policy more attractive.
2. Because we did not optimally position the inventory among bases, we may have
underestimated the benefits of a centralized inventory system that allows lateral
re-supply. By not optimally positioning where the SecReps should be maintained
within our model, we essentially account for transfer costs that may not have
occurred had the SecReps been positioned to minimize transportation costs.
Although our results show a slight financial advantage for the lateral transfer
policy, it might be the case that significantly more savings could be obtained with
optimally positioned stock.
E. OTHER ISSUES
There are other potential benefits of a centralized system. For example, maintenance
and supply personnel at certain locations may be reduced because of lower inventory
levels. With lower inventory levels, there are fewer items to manage and maintain.
Savings are possible in less maintenance of embarkation boxes, conducting fewer routine
technical inspections of SecReps, and less packaging and corrosion prevention.
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Kang [Ref. 36] suggests that centralization enables a company to maintain tight
control while consolidating shipments and lowering cost. He also sites a 1 993 University
of Maryland survey of 20 companies seeking best logistics practices, which found that all
of them had centralized their strategic logistics management function in proximity to their
corporate center. Although most of the companies cited do not move large items that are
expensive to transport, they all cited increased control, improved efficiencies, and lower
costs as the primary motivations behind their centralization philosophy. Mullinix [Ref.
37] suggests that the majority of Fortune 500 companies that have moved to
centralization agreed that hardware, people, and maintenance are more economically used
in a centralized order-management environment than in a decentralized one. He indicates
that they believe that centralization facilitates integration of order management with other
operating systems, such as production planning, scheduling, transportation management,
and warehouse management. He also indicated that the companies reported that
centralization results in better customer service and enhances customer perception that a
company is "easy to do business with."
There are also areas for concern. First, the Marine Corps must specify an
organizational structure to centrally manage SecRep inventories. Questions include:
Will all inventory decision-making power be moved to MCLB Albany, or will the bases
continue to have limited authority? If they will, how much? Some decentralized systems
are organized as "virtual organizations", which Sandhoff [Ref. 33] defines as a network
operating on the principle of self-organization. Central to Sandhoff s concept of a virtual
organization is that the organizational-structure is replaced by new information and
communication technologies (ICT), trust, and open communication. He suggests that
loosely linked nodal points within the network replace the formal structure in a virtual
organization and that all actors have equal participation.
An advantage to this type of structure is that information about all of the elements
and participants becomes an asset to the whole organization. Successful process and
systems can quickly be exploited and horizontally and vertically disseminated throughout
the organization. Additionally, information sharing is a key success factor within a virtual
organization. Ishaya [Ref. 34] suggests that while virtual organizations present laudable
opportunities, they also present a number of uncertainties and challenges. He indicates
that this has led to the argument that trust may not be possible in virtual organizations.
The movement to a virtual float concept might require levels of trust and information
sharing that do not currently exist. Additionally, new methods of communication and
information systems would probably have to be established to support a virtual
organization.
Kang [Ref. 36] indicates that in the commercial sector, inventory management
personnel typically remain in the same job for several years, and often stay in the same
location for their entire career. He also indicates that a similar situation exists for some
DoD civilian inventory managers. He suggests that this is not the case for operating
forces, with a 25% personnel turnover rate each year. He argues that because military
supply personnel rotate through different tasks in order to acquire a variety of skills, they
do not develop in-depth inventory management experience. While centralizing inventory
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management in MCLB Albany. GA would capitalize on the experience of civilian
inventory managers, there are potentially negative effects on their ability to manage:
• Under a centralized inventory system, information available to the inventory
managers would be limited, such as when exercise and training evolutions are
planned, and how past exercises and operations affected demand for SecReps.
The demand for a SecRep is a function of the operating hours of the PEL As PEIs
are utilized more frequently during exercises or training evolutions, the failure
rate for SecReps usually increases. Although planned operating hours for
equipment is currently not tracked within the Marine Corps, each MEF is able to
estimate planned usage of equipment based on local operations and training plans.
Without systems or processes in place to determine planned usage, a centralized
inventory manager might not be able to forecast planned usage of PEIs as would a
local inventory manager.
• A centralized inventory manager might not have access to local maintenance and
supply personnel capabilities, and might not be able to account for rotation and
training issues [Ref. 6. 26] because he does not possess "local knowledge".
• Finally, a centralized inventory manager could have more difficulty determining
the accuracy of the data reported by the MEFs, traditionally a weak spot for
Marine Corps supply support.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In a world characterized by accelerating change, the challenge becomes one of
sorting, selecting and casting meaningful change initiatives. We believe that simulation
tools can help to validate new concepts and provide a foundation for the strategic,
operational, and tactical direction of Marine Corps Logistics. We provided an overview
of inventory issues and policies, presented our research problem, and stated the objective
of the thesis within Chapter I. We started out by describing the direction of the DoD with
respect to inventory management and the Marine Corps virtual float concept.
Additionally, we discussed the current supply chain for SecReps and presented an
overview of the basic functions of the repairable issue point (RIP). We described the
demand based sparing (DBS) methodology currently used to determine inventory levels
and discussed other relevant studies and research with respect to repairable inventory
management. We showed that the Marine Corps has started to progress towards
readiness-based sparing (RBS) by chartering studies through the Center for Naval
Analyses (CNA), but will have difficulty implementing RBS due to inaccurate data
collection. We presented the ideal that simulation and modeling of the Marine Corps'
supply chain can be used to evaluate different policies. We show that a centralized,
lateral transfer policy might not provide significant cost savings, when considering both
inventory and transportation costs.
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A. CONCLUSIONS
Using a simulation model, we considered trade-offs associated with centralized
inventory management, stock reduction, and transportation cost. Specifically, we asked
what overall inventory policy satisfies demand while minimizing inventory holding cost
and transportation cost. We believe that the Marine Corps should not expect large
savings from a virtual float operating with a lateral transfer inventory policy. For the
items we selected, we estimated a modest annual savings of no more than $50,000.
We believe the unimpressive savings are due primarily to two factors. First,
lateral re-supply is expensive for large items in the Marine Corps system, because bases
are far apart. For our test items, this greatly diminished the benefits of reduced inventory
levels. Second, we did not optimally position stock among bases. It is possible that
greater savings are possible with better placement of inventory.
We also argued that a virtual float has significant issues that should be resolved
prior to implementation, such as: Are information systems in place to support centralized
management of repairables? Will a virtual float simply function as a centralized
organization or function as a virtual organization? Are there enough resources and
capacity within the supply chain to support lateral transfer? and. What will be the
measure of effectiveness of a virtual float? Overall system readiness or readiness based
on the individual location?
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Do not implement a "Virtual Warehouse" concept based on potential
financial savings.
Our research showed that the potential financial savings of lateral transfers are
marginal at best, due primarily, we believe, to the great distances, and therefore high
transportation costs between Marine Corps bases. The decision to implement a virtual
warehouse concept should be based on the expected long term benefits of centralization
that commercial firms currently receive, e.g., reduced overhead support structure for
personnel, finance, automated data processing (ADP) systems, and integrating logistics
within strategic policy.
2. Determine the level of resources and capacity at each location within the
supply chain.
Our research supports that overall inventories may be reduced for selected items.
However, we also showed that some locations might function as a sort of distribution
center to other, more distant bases, and therefore would have more inventory. Before
implementing a virtual float, the resources at each location should be analyzed to
determine if there is enough capacity to support a virtual float.
3. Incorporate transportation cost and holding cost within Marine Corps
policy to improve logistics decision making.
Without accounting for these costs, sub-optimal decisions are certain. In our case,
not accounting for transportation costs would suggest that lateral transfer is an attractive
policy without reservation. Our findings suggest that accounting for both costs is vital to
making a proper decision on whether or not to centralize.
4. Develop an optimal stock-positioning model.
Developing an optimal stock-positioning model would enhance the potential
benefits a virtual float. Additionally, an optimal stock-positioning model should consider
A and readiness and provide the basis for future inventory applications.
C. FUTURE
Further research should consist of determining the effects of RCT at each location
and how that affects that overall system. As the RCT decreases, does the A increase?
and by how much? Should the Marine Corps establish centers of excellence or focused
factories at each location to reduce RCT? For example, 1 st FSSG may establish a center
of excellence in AAV engine repair and consequently reduce their RCT significantly. All
AAV engines would be sent to 1 st FSSG, as they become the primary distribution center
for AAV engines.
Finally, further research should define the characteristics of a virtual float. Who
will be the participants? How will information flow within the supply chain? Will all
RIPs have equal claim to any SecRep required within the supply chain? and What will be
the standard to deliver the required SecReps? 48 hours? 72 hours? We suggest that the
relationship between the central item managers and the FMF is dependant on clearly
defined expectations of service and is therefore a key success factor for a virtual float.
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APPENDIX B. SERVICE STANDARDS FOR OVERNIGHT
TRANSPORTATION
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